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ABSTRACT: The exhausting Ottoman wars waged in the vicinity of the
Dubrovnik Republic were marked by disorder and anarchy. The bordering
villages of the Republic’s counties (Konavle, Æupa, and Primorje) became the
victims of a mob law that spread from Herzegovina like a disease. The Re-
public’s frontiersmen thus polarized into brigands and non-brigands, their
mutual hatred being particularly strong. Life in this area was characterized by
constant ravages, plunder, famine, and plague. The population was unable to
use the pastures and fields in Herzegovina. Small-scale trade across the bor-
der was hampered, contributing further to the unbearable conditions in the
area.
A number of wars against the Ottoman Empire, strongly characterized by
brigandage, took place in the vicinity of the Dubrovnik Republic. Although
the Ragusan government claimed to be neutral in these wars, many Ragusan
subjects, mostly inhabitants of the border villages in the regions of Primorje,
Æupa and Konavle, were involved, either as brigands (Turk. haydut) or brig-
and victims. This phenomenon was most prominent during the second half
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of the seventeenth century as a direct consequence of two wearisome wars
(the Cretan War 1645-1669, and the Morean War 1684-1699).
The Republic’s economy weakened notably in the period when the
Herzegovinian hinterland came under Venetian rule (during the Morean War
and the Turco-Venetian War of 1714-1718).1 Trade with the inland was ex-
acerbated by attacks on caravans and merchants on their way to or from
Dubrovnik, the purpose of which was to destroy every commercial link with
the Republic and bring it down to its knees. This specific warfare was car-
ried out by Venetian brigands and Ottoman rebels, mostly Vlachs, who suc-
ceeded in halting every form of trade with Dubrovnik. As a result, the Re-
public’s ruling class suffered considerable business losses, which was the
central goal of the Venetian authorities.
Moreover, Venetians wanted to destroy the authority of the Ragusan
patriciate by attempting to win over the Ragusan commoners: In the Repub-
lic itself, Venetian agents schemed to recruit Ragusan subjects for the Venetian
army,2 using force as a common method.3 Furthermore, Ragusan farmers
along the frontier, accustomed to taking their herds to pastures in the
Herzegovinian hinterland in agreement with the Ottoman landowners, were
persistently encouraged by Venice to continue with this practice.4
In a number of conflicts, the Republic of Dubrovnik usually declared it-
self a neutral party, a status which often proved difficult to maintain. Being
shuttled about and straining to maintain its position, Dubrovnik nevertheless
had a very firm and clear position regarding the Venetians, which could be
characterized as that of lasting animosity. Over hundreds of years, the
Ragusans devoted much attention to the Ottoman rulers in Herzegovina, since
the hinterland was of vital importance to them. The main trade route passed
1 Vinko ForetiÊ, Povijest Dubrovnika do 1808, II. Zagreb: Nakladni zavod MH, 1980: pp. 183,
191, 197, 206, 209.
2 In the first years of the Morean War, the Venetians attempted to recruit as many as eight
hundred Ragusan subjects (Gligor StanojeviÊ, Jugoslovenske zemlje u mletaËko-turskim ratovima
XVI-XVIII vijeka. Beograd: Istorijski institut, 1970: p. 354).
3 In the 1690s, one Venetian kidnapped several Ragusan subjects to row on the galleys. The
Ragusans subsequently got hold of the aforementioned Venetian in 1701. He was secretly executed
in the Ragusan prison (State Archives of Dubrovnik (hereafter cited as: SAD), ser. 76, Diplomata
et acta saec. XVIII (hereafter cited as: DA 18), vol. 3400, no. 16.
4 DA 18, vol. 3185, no. 1; DA 18, vol. 186/3 b, no. 14; SAD, Diplomata et acta saec. XVII
(hereafter cited as: DA 17), vol. 2125, no. 48, 51.
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through Herzegovinian territory, contributing to the strategic significance of
this belt of Venetian land bordering the narrow strips of Republic’s territory.
Dubrovnik had every interest in seeing a friendly state rule over the
Herzegovinian hinterland, as its prosperity directly depended upon it. Rela-
tions between Dubrovnik and Venice were always hostile; therefore, at the
slightest possibility of the hinterland falling into Venetian hands, Dubrovnik’s
diplomatic activities had no limits. Cornered by the Venetians, the Ottomans,
and the Austrians during the Morean War,5 Dubrovnik balanced its relations
with all sides, although sanctions from one warring party or another were to
be expected. It supplied the Ottomans with food, ammunition and informa-
tion, but also allowed the bands of brigands to travel across the Ragusan ter-
ritory, since it was unable to stop them anyway. Ragusans issued a clear state-
ment that the bands were only permitted to pass through the territory, with-
out any delay. Unfortunately, this requirement went unheeded, for brigands
took their time passing through the Ragusan territory in order to rob Ragusan
subjects. Had the authorities confronted them in any way, the conditions would
most likely have worsened.
It is evident that parts of the Ragusan state, borderlands in particular, were
plagued with anarchy. Parts of the Venetian, Ottoman, and Ragusan states
were all victims of brigand raids. Venetian subjects from Boka and regions
west of the Republic, Ottoman outlaws from Herzegovina and Montenegro,
and Ragusan outlaws were all recruited into the brigand bands. In opposition
to these, the victims of the brigands - i.e., their enemies - can be placed into
several categories.
The first of these categories was the Muslims, some of whom belonged to
the peasantry, others to the rich and privileged ranks. These were the great-
est enemies of the brigands, although they were free to join the brigands
whenever they wished, and a great many brigands had accomplices among
them.6
5 V. ForetiÊ, Povijest Dubrovnika do 1808, II: pp. 174-195, 197.
6 Duπan J. PopoviÊ, O hajducima I. Beograd: Narodna πtamparija, 1930: p. 98 (author comments
on well-known Muslim brigands); Id., O hajducima II. Beograd: Narodna πtamparija, 1937: p. 38
(author infers that almost every brigand had a Muslim for a blood brother or trustworthy friend);
Aleksandar Matkovski, ≈Mjere turskih vlasti za likvidiranje hajduËije u Makedoniji u prvoj polovini
XVII veka.« Jugoslovenski istorijski Ëasopis 1-4 (1967): p. 207 (in reference to Ottoman criminal
counter-measures against brigands, the author remarks that those undertaken against Muslim brig-
ands were somewhat less severe); Radovan SamardæiÊ, Borba Dubrovnika za opstanak posle velikog
zemljotresa 1667. godine. Beograd: SAN, 1960: pp. 368-370; DA 17, vol. 2129, no. 99.
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Vlachs who were Ottoman subjects constituted the second category of
brigand victims/enemies. Willingly or by force, some Ottoman Vlachs re-
mained loyal to their governors, with whom they retreated before the enemy
forces; others remained and collaborated with brigands. These were victim-
ized by their governors and the brigands alike. Everyone related to a brigand
was pursued, as well as those suspected of collaboration.7 Vlach brigands were
equally ruthless toward Muslims and Vlachs, be they their kin or fellow-vil-
lagers.8 Fleeing this terror, many of these Vlachs sought shelter within the
territory of the Republic.9 At the same time, some Vlachs who lived and had
jobs in the Republic moved out of the state in order to join their cousins and
compatriots in the brigand bands. But it were so-called brigand consuls,Vlachs
who remained in the Republic with the assignment of recruiting new brig-
ands, that were the greatest trial for Dubrovnik. The results of a thorough
investigation carried out in May 1684 indicate that despite being good crafts-
men and soldiers in Dubrovnik, some Vlachs were unable to resist the call:
≈Let’s join the brigands; why stay here?« Different opinions, however, were
also heard: ≈I have a job, I work here, I won’t go there. I am doing fine
here.«10
Some of the Ottoman Vlachs joined the Ottoman police service ≈pandours«
(Hung. pandúr, armed guard), their duty being to maintain order, peace, and
security in the Ottoman region. Although smaller in number than the first two
categories, pandours represented a specific group, as they were armed and
had the least military training. While some remained in the service of the
Ottoman state, a number of pandours collaborated with brigands, or even went
a step further and resigned from the pandour service so as to join brigands.11
It is evident that all three groups—Muslims, Vlachs, and padours—were
tempted at one time or another to join brigand bands, being confronted with
the proposition of replacing their former status of victim with the only op-
7 DA 18, vol. 3349/2, no. 12; A. Matkovski, ≈Mjere turskih vlasti«: pp. 187-207.
8 Gligor StanojeviÊ, ≈Crna Gora u doba kandiskog rata (1645-1669).« Istoriski glasnik 1-2
(1953): p. 49.
9 DA 17, vol. 2052, no. 71.
10 DA 17, vol. 16, no. 1666.
11 DA 17, vol. 2053, no. 5;  Radovan SamardæiÊ, Veliki vek Dubrovnika. Beograd: Prosveta,
1983: p. 375.
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tion left to them, that of a villain. With regard to the population, the war
against the Ottomans should be viewed as a conflict between brigands and
≈non-brigands«. ≈Who isn’t with us, is against us« was the ruling brigand
motto, which expressed a two-fold benefit. It was the perfect excuse for brig-
ands to rob non-brigands, and at the same time it forced the latter to join the
brigand bands and reinforce the outlaw gangs. In addition, other principles
changed in accordance with the current war situation. In the periods when
the Venetians and the Ottomans were at war, Venetians and brigands had
common interests. Brigands thus had free hands to do as they pleased, and
enjoyed the support of an official state. However, in cases when Venice did
not require brigand services, the brigands’ exploits were unstoppable.12 Ven-
ice’s relationship with the brigands became particularly onerous after the war,
due to the changing course of Venetian policy towards the Ottoman Empire.
Brigands were but an unpleasant and bloody episode, which soon had to be
forgotten. Thus, in post-war years the Venetians resorted to measures aimed
at displacing them. On the other hand, when the activities of the brigands failed
to meet their goals, or when aware that the Ottomans might inflict severe
punishments on them, or when they estimated Venetian help to be insuffi-
cient, the brigands would retreat under the Ottoman wing. With or without
Venetian support, they acted in accordance with the prevailing conditions.13
The brigands along the three borders were stirred into action by many fac-
tors: poverty as the aftermath of long wars, famine, tyrannical masters, gen-
eral insecurity, a feeling of despair and hopelessness. In these fermenting ≈high
risk« circumstances, joining brigand bands seemed to have been the only
solution for a great many who saw it an easier way of earning one’s living.
These desperadoes found themselves in the company of convicts and dan-
gerous criminals running away from imprisonment or the death penalty. This
atmosphere of social erosion and distress opened way to anarchy and moral
disorder when plunder was valued as ≈work«, and work looked upon as fruit-
12 Bogumil Hrabak, ≈Trebinje, Popovo i Donja Neretva u hajduËkom vojevanju za vreme
morejskog rata.« Prilozi Instituta za istoriju u Sarajevu 17 (1980): p. 94; P.D.©, ≈Jedna dozvola
hajduËkim harambaπama da mogu upadati u tursku zemlju.« Istorijski zapisi 10 (1954): pp. 214,
215; DA 17, vol. 2052, no. 93.
13 Radovan SamardæiÊ, ≈Odnosi Bosne i Dubrovnika od 1656 do 1662.« Godiπnjak Istoriskog
druπtva Bosne i Hercegovine 8 (1956): p. 111.
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14 Folk songs depict the deeds of the Montenegrin brigand Radulica KneæeviÊ (Salko NazeËiÊ,
≈HajduËke borbe oko Dubrovnika u drugoj polovini 17 vijeka i naπa narodna pjesma.« Pitanja
knjiæevnosti i jezika 1-2 (1955): p. 38). According to Ragusan sources, was a most vicious robber,
murderer, and kidnapper on Ragusan territory. KneæeviÊ was recorded as a kidnapper prior to the
great earthquake of 1667. Accompanied by his brother, he abducted a girl in Konavle and stole
her herd. Her father testified on this incident in March 1672, still with no knowledge of the wherea-
bouts of his daughter (DA 17, vol. 2051, no. 127). From 1670 to 1676, that is, during the time of
peace between the Candian and Morean Wars, KneæeviÊ and his band killed eleven men in Konavle,
kidnapped eight, and stole about 1,900 head of cattle (SAD, ser. 75, Acta Turcarum (hereafter cited
as: AT), no. 4322, 4323, 4395; AT, C 7, 1; AT, no. 1111, 4110; DA 17, vol. 1805 a, no. 4; DA 17,
vol. 2051, no. 3, 101; SAD, ser. 27.1, Lettere di Levante (hereafter cited as: LL), vol. 62, f. 129,
133; LL, vol. 63, f. 109v, 111v. On KneæeviÊ’s robberies also see Bogumil Hrabak, ≈Upadi
Crnogoraca na dubrovaËku teritoriju u XVI i XVII veku.« Istorijski zapisi 4 (1978): pp. 33-57.
15 DA 18, vol. 3349/2, no. 83.
less luxury. Generally, it is not possible to draw a clear line between those
brigands who under the guise of freedom fighters robbed and plundered,14
and, those impoverished and miserable individuals who saw joining the bands
as their only way to survive. The words of one band leader (Turk. harami
basi) during the Venetian-Ottoman War of 1714-1718, whose brigands were
accused for having stolen wine and fruit in Primorje, are most illustrative:
≈There are all kinds of people; the commander cannot keep an eye on every-
one. Fruit is bare subsistence for one, and delicacy for another.«15
This was but one in a series of minor thefts experienced by the Ragusan
subjects during the Ottoman wars, when brigands frequently invaded Ragusan
villages, stealing, killing, and enslaving its inhabitants. Brigands were a peril
both to the Republic’s frontier lands and to the peninsula of Peljeπac, the is-
lands, the coast, and villages unfortunate enough to find themselves on the
brigand routes to and from Ottoman Herzegovina. Everything was consid-
ered good enough prey: cattle (the most valuable form of property), cereals,
farming tools, weapons. They emptied wine cellars, taking not only barrels,
but the pots too. They helped themselves to all kinds of food, shoes and cloth-
ing, cloths, money, trunks, doors, windows. What they could not load was
doomed to destruction. Starving brigands boarded in the houses of already
famished Ragusans without any payment. In addition to brigands, the master
criminals on the territory of the Republic, Ragusan subjects also fell victim
to the plunder of those who held a grudge against the Republic and who were
given the chance to revolt against its policies and its actions.
,
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Kidnapping and slave trade were the hallmarks of brigand warfare. By day
and by night, Ragusan subjects would disappear from their houses, fields,
meadows, and roads, wherever they encountered the kidnappers. They were
sold for oarsmen on Venetian galleys. They could be traced to Boka,
Herzegovina, and even the Apennine peninsula as servants or slaves. Those
captives for whom their relatives or they themselves were able to pay ran-
som could have been considered truly lucky. Ransom was usually paid in cash
or cloths.16 The highest ransom was 150 sequins, which was set for the
Ragusan courier Mihajlo Macinjelo. According to Macinjelo’s testimony of
the event, the brigands let him go in order for him to fetch the money under
the threat of death.17 Such a high price was set for a reason. In the Morean
War Macinjelo was of particular importance to Dubrovnik. Between May 1691
and December 1696 this messenger risked his life carrying dispatches to
Constantinople and Edirne on four occasions.18 Besides ransom, the Ragusans
would sometimes revert to yet another method of freeing kidnapped people.
A Ragusan subject could also be exchanged for a brigand, one who was kid-
napped for that particular purpose.19
Primorje (the westernmost Ragusan region) was largely the victim of brig-
and bands from the territories west of the Republic (Makarska, Opuzen,
Vrgorac, Omiπ, etc.). On some occasions they poured into villages on their
return from Herzegovina, especially if the prey had been a miserable one.
Primorje was also a favorite ≈hunting ground« of the brigands from the
Herzegovinian hinterland (Popovo polje and Zaæablje).20
16 DA 17, vol. 2052, no. 72; DA 17, vol. 2125, no. 56, 85, 94, 95, 186, 188; DA 17, vol. 2131,
no. 81, 100. Ragusans contributed to the payment of ransom for 39 Ragusan subjects kidnapped
during the years of the Morean War (Hamdija HajdarhodæiÊ, ≈Neki podaci o stanju na dubrovaËko-
hercegovaËkoj granici poslije KarlovaËkog mira.« Glasnik arhiva i Druπtva arhivskih radnika BiH
7 (1967): p. 275).
17 DA 17, vol. 2125, no. 49.
18 Jovan RadoniÊ, DubrovaËka akta i povelje. IV/2 (hereafter cited as: DAiP, IV/2). Beograd:
SKA, 1942: pp. 107, 114, 141, 155, 202, 212, 270, 357, 407, 422, 430.
19 DA 17, vol. 2125, no. 203, 307.
20 DA 17, vol. 16, no. 1663, 1676, 1677. DA 17; vol. 1686, no. 4; DA 17, vol. 2125, no. 68;
DA 17, vol. 2132; Jovan RadoniÊ, DubrovaËka akta i povelje. IV/1 (hereafter cited as: DAiP, IV/
1). Beograd, SKA, 1941: pp. 153, 155, 156, 166, 388, 389, 739; DAiP, IV/2: p. 372.
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Konavle (the easternmost region) and Æupa (situated between Primorje and
Konavle), however, were tormented by brigands from Herzegovina and Boka,
comprising Montenegrins, Vlachs, and Turks. Being located on the route
between the brigand headquarters in Boka and the rest of Ottoman
Herzegovina, the village of Mrcine (Konavle) was raided repeatedly.21
Extensive records concerning these thefts and kidnapping have been pre-
served. An indictment of December 1693 reports of a total theft of 20,000
head of cattle which the brigands had stolen on the Ragusan territory from
the beginning of the Morean War.22
Faced with anarchy and daily brigand activity in the borderland and the
inner territory as well, a number of Ragusan subjects took to brigand ways,
too. The former conditions of regular trade, food supply, and cattle freely graz-
ing on home pastures and Herzegovinian commons were now considerably
hampered. The irregular supply and flow of goods induced poverty and lack
of subsistence. A considerable number of records document the terrible fam-
ine of Ragusans and Ottoman subjects who had fled to the Republic. Vlach
immigrants, sheltered in a roadside inn at Brgat (Æupa), which served as a
quarantine station as well, literally starved to death.23 Some Ragusan sub-
jects were ready to go anywhere in quest of jobs, be that even the Venetian
army.24 Others starved when they were left with no animals to pull their carts
to the first mill in order to have their wheat ground.25 Famine was joined by
plague, the most severe one being in 1691. The epidemics spread to the city
of Dubrovnik itself, Primorje (Dubravica), and Konavle (Gruda and Rado-
vËiÊi).26 Two theories about the plague epidemic in the area have been noted.
21 DA 17, vol. 16 no. 1676, 1680; DA 17, vol. 1964, no. 2; DA 17, vol. 2052, no. 71, 72; DA
17, vol. 2053, no. 5; DA 17, vol. 2079, no. 8; DA 17, vol. 2125, no. 93-95, 147, 160, 163, 171,
177; DA 17, vol. 2132, no. 49, 218, 221; AT, no. 4785; LL, 64, 333; SAD, ser. 50, Lamenta del
Criminale (hereafter cited as: LC), vol. 16, f. 15v, 16, 20v-21v; DAiP, IV/1: pp. 216, 465; B. Hrabak,
≈Trebinje, Popovo i Donja Neretva«: p. 89.
22 DAiP, IV/2: pp. 315, 316.
23 DA 17, vol. 2132, no. 90.
24 DA 17, vol. 2132, no. 122, 115.
25 DA 17, vol. 2131, no. 70.
26 DA 17, vol. 2132, no. 108, 115, 118; –uro OrliÊ, ≈DubrovaËke vijesti o epidemijama u Bosni
i Hercegovini 1463-1800.« Graa NauËnog druπtva BiH 2 (1956): pp. 47-64; Bogumil Hrabak,
≈Kuæne rednje u Bosni i Hercegovini 1463-1800.« Istorijski zbornik-Banja Luka 2 (1981): p. 24;
DA 17, vol. 2132, no. 108, 118.
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According to the first explanation, servant girls on duty at the hospital in
Dubrovnik brought some contagious clothes with them from Herzegovina.
This epidemic is thus commonly referred to as ≈La peste delle serve.≈ The
second theory holds brigands responsible for spreading of the plague in the
Republic, for they did not respect the quarantine regulations while crossing
the border.27 In order to illustrate this, I shall advert to a letter addressed to
the Ragusan government by a health officer from Konavle in which he im-
plicitly states that a brigand company passed through Konavle in June 1690,
carrying the stolen property of a Turkish functionary who had recently died
of the plague.28
Numerous health officers gave reports to the Ragusan government about
brigand robberies in the border villages.29 Other signs of inefficiency on the
part of the authorities include related phenomena that occurred in that period
such as collaboration between Ragusan subjects and brigands, kidnappings,
and murders. Even some health wardens were alleged to have taken part in
these activities.30 No concern was paid to the avoidance of immediate con-
tact. For instance, even at the height of the epidemic, the villagers of »epikuÊe
(Primorje) traded with Vlachs from the hinterland. The latter had come to
the village in order to buy salted sardines. The event was recorded due to an
incident concerning the indecent behavior of a Ragusan patrician, the senior
health officer to the »epikuÊe area, who had been reported to the government.
A subordinate health officer had tipped the patrician off: ≈Sir, Vlachs have
loaded seven horses here in the village,« and the nobleman’s reply was: ≈As
soon as it dawns, we’ll take to our heels before these folk beat us.«31
Infernal conditions on Ragusan territory and its vicinity, as well as gloomy
prospects for the future, urged Ragusan subjects to resort to all kinds of ac-
tivities. The government worked on a series of measures and decrees in or-
der to prevent its subjects from collaborating either with the brigands or their
27 DAiP, IV/2: pp. 29, 30, 41, 74.
28 DA 17, vol. 2132, no. 3.
29 DA 17, vol. 2125, no. 68, 186, 188, 209, 233; DA 17, vol. 2131, no. 88, 116; DA 17, vol.
2132, no. 220.
30 DA 17, vol. 16, no. 1675; DA 17, vol. 2051, no. 60; DA 17, vol. 2052, no. 96; DA 17, vol.
2053, no. 8.
31 DA 17, vol. 2053, no. 23.
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enemies. Still, the neutrality of the Ragusan state could hardly be maintained
politically, and in practice this goal was almost impossible to achieve. Strict
orders, prohibitions and threats of imprisonment, the galley, and hanging were
completely ineffective in the years of the Morean War. The brigand / non-
brigand stratification of the Ragusan population was sharply accentuated, pro-
voking revengeful reactions by the hostile side from Herzegovina.32 The ab-
surd situation in Herzegovina where brigands plundered and murdered their
own countrymen and neighbors, spread throughout the Dubrovnik Republic,
too. Ragusan brigands attacked their non-brigand compatriots,33 and vice
versa.34
In the disorder and anarchy in Herzegovina, many saw their chance: ≈Come
on, there is no order, we can grab animals in the Turkish area without pun-
ishment« - was a strong argument which circled round the Ragusan region,
attracting both ≈the hungry and the greedy.«35
Despite all the measures and threats taken by the Ragusan authorities, re-
cruiting the Ragusan population into brigand bands was more than common.
First in Konavle, then in Æupa and Primorje, the authorities launched investi-
gations with the purpose of identifying Ragusan brigands.36 On 2 May 1684,
shortly after Venice had joined the anti-Ottoman campaign, the Senate issued
death-warrants for all those brigands who would return home within a period
of eight days. On 22 May the Senate prolonged this order to 15 June 1684
inclusive, and it concerned all those who had not previously been convicted
for any specific crime committed as brigand accomplices. The following day
saw an additional decree by which everyone who had not committed any
specific crime would receive a reward of 100 sequins for capturing and bring-
ing to justice a compatriot who was guilty of a crime.37 During 1687, an or-
32 R. SamardæiÊ, Borba Dubrovnika za opstanak: pp. 385, 386; DAiP, IV/2: pp. 218, 229; DA
17, vol. 2129, no. 98.
33 DA 17, vol. 2125, no. 55; DA 17, vol. 2125, no classification number, dated 11 March 1697.
DA 17, vol. 2131, no. 84; DA 17, vol. 1686, no. 7; LC, vol. 32, f. 184, 184v, 217v-219, 231v-233,
240v.
34 DA 17, vol. 2131, no. 113, 115.
35 DA 17, vol. 16, no. 1675.
36 DA 17, vol. 16, no. 1665, 1670, 1671, 1675; DA 17, vol. 2052, no. 13, 14, 93; SAD, ser. 3,
Acta Consilii Rogatorum (hereafter cited as: CR), vol. 128, f. 222v.
37 CR, vol. 127, f. 2, 19rv.
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der to capture all the Ragusan brigands hiding on Ragusan soil was issued
twice. In June 1692 the Senate repeated its appeal that the Ragusan brigands
who had committed no offence return freely to their homes. In April 1693,
the Senate came forward with a proposal concerning the Ragusan brigands
who wished to join the Napolitan Navy; the proposal guaranteed them safe
passage through Ragusan territory prior to their departure for Naples.38 Oc-
casionally, the Ragusan authorities would act against Herzegovinian brigands
who had committed offences within the former’s jurisdiction; several of these
were thus executed during the Morean War.39
The authorities’ appeals and threats, however, did not remain fruitless, as
some of the Ragusan brigands returned to their villages but not for long. In
1687, several men from Konavle returned home but were practically ready
to join brigands again, even if perchance it meant going at once.40 In fact,
some of them did join the bands again several months later.41
A number of Ragusan subjects joined brigands not more than once or twice,
only to return home soon after, hoping that their errands would pass unde-
tected by the Ragusan authorities. Some proved to have been true amateurs
in brigand activities: while their professional comrades were robbing a cara-
van on its way from Dubrovnik in 1687, one group of Ragusan brigands did
not seem fit for the role. Their share of the prey was equal to their engage-
ment in the robbery: ≈this is for the wine, since you did not join us, bigger
share you cannot get, and this we give you as incentive to come with us next
time« explained one band leader to Ragusan brigands as he handed out a se-
quin or two, or as little as few groshets.
Ragusan authorities launched a thorough investigation concerning this
robbery and established that thirty men from Æupa took part in it. Being pro-
vided with the names of the man who joined the brigands in their attack on
the caravan carrying wax to Dubrovnik, as well as of those who took part in
other robberies and attacks, the government appealed to all people involved
38 CR, vol. 128, f. 214, 222v, 225v; CR, vol. 132, f. 102v, 217.
39 S. NazeËiÊ, ≈HajduËke borbe«: pp. 35, 36; B. Hrabak, ≈Trebinje, Popovo i Donja Neretva«:
pp. 73, 74, 91.
40 DA 17, vol. 2052, no. 93.
41 DA 17, vol. 16, no. 1670.
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in the matter to report freely to the investigator and give their statement of
the events, after which they could retire without any restriction. Only a third
of the men were to report to the authorities.42
Contrary to those who were inexperienced in the job, the hardened crimi-
nals stayed away from their villages and were visited in secret. Some of those
who topped the list of wanted men are described in the following paragraphs:
A warrant for the arrest of –uro Vragolov from Konavle was issued twice.
He joined the brigands at the very beginning of the Morean War and took
part in a number of robberies. He was arrested and questioned in May 1689.
In the course of the investigation, he gave a brief account of all his actions
after having fled the Republic: ≈The first two years I spent with the brigands.
After being wounded in the leg while with the brigands, I remained in Perast
the next two years. The first year I was on a ship, and the second I earned
my salary with harambasha Miladin in Carina.« Vragolov was strangled in
the dungeon on the night of 28 May.43
Konavle was to breed three more outlaws—Pero Bronzan, Ivan KovaËiÊ
©kadrica, and –uro Alaga. All three were known for their criminal activities
during the Morean War, while the first two had started during the Cretan War.
≈I have heard, gentlemen, that those three are the leaders of all the brigands
from Konavle«, reported one witness.44
In addition, the documents contain more names of Ragusan brigands, many
of which were recorded in complaints filed against them by Ottoman authori-
ties and subjects.45
Directly taking part in brigand activities was not the only crime a Ragusan
subject might have resorted to. Some collaborated with the outlaws by buy-
ing up goods stolen in Herzegovina or even on the Ragusan territory.46
42 DA 17, vol. 16, no. 1675 (investigation carried out in 1687).
43 B. Hrabak, ≈Trebinje, Popovo i Donja Neretva«: pp. 72, 74; DA 17, vol. 2052, no. 13, 14;
CR, vol. 130, f. 70.
44 DA 17, vol. 16, no. 1665.
45 DA 17, vol. 16, no. 1671, 1680; DA 17, vol. 2052, no. 93, 94; DA 17, vol. 2152, no. 95,
164, 243, 247; DA 17, vol. 2132, no. 106; AT, vol. B 52, no. 33, 39; AT, vol. B 53, no. 38, 44;
DAiP, IV/1: p. 310.
46 DA 17, vol. 16, no. 1664, 1674.
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Others, however, were holding Vlach property for safekeeping which fur-
ther attracted brigands to Ragusan territory. When in 1687 the Ragusan gov-
ernment launched an investigation against those holding Vlach property, it
was established that the Vlachs from the Herzegovinian hinterland had 840
head of cattle in Konavle. Brigands, mostly their kin and fellow-villagers,
managed to steal 730 head.47
Victimized and terrorized during the Morean War, Ragusan subjects re-
acted vengefully at times, only to suffer further losses. These conflicts took
place between 1689 and 1699. During this period Ragusans killed ten Venetian
and Ottoman outlaws. The majority of the counterkillings were committed in
self-defence,48 blood feuds,49 and fights generally started by the other party.
With regard to the Ragusan subjects the institution of the feud often sur-
passed the original meaning of the phenomenon, serving thus as a pretext for
merciless and highly cruel robberies, homicides, and kidnappings. This vin-
dictive urge was omnipresent and a single misdeed was often revenged sev-
eral times over. Offenders who were related neither by kinship or by other
means to the killed—nor to anyone suffering a loss of any kind—were the
perpetrators of most brutal thefts and murders under the pretext of revenge.
In all their vengeful activities (1689-1699), the Vlachs avenged the kill-
ing of ten of their fellow-robbers with the murder of thirteen Ragusan sub-
jects, six of them were kidnapped, one of those was killed immediately, while
the fate of the other five remained unknown. They also stole around 1,400
head of cattle in addition to the prey of many more robberies which cannot
be supported by conclusive numerical data.50
47 DA 17, vol. 16, no. 1674; DA 17, vol. 2125, no. 289; B. Hrabak, ≈Trebinje, Popovo i Donja
Neretva«: p. 78.
48 LC, vol. 37, f. 117-120; LC, vol. 40, f. 6rv. DA 17, vol. 1686, no. 7, 9, 10; DA 17, vol.
2125, no. 118, 126, 142, 182, 203, 220, 215, 240, 242, 248, 251, 258, 264, 307; DA 17, vol. 3346,
no. 5, as well as documents bearing no classification number dated 25 and 26 July 1700; DA 18,
vol. 181/5, no. 250; H. HajdarhodæiÊ, ≈Neki podaci o stanju na dubrovaËko-hercegovaËkoj granici
poslije KarlovaËkog mira.«: p. 279.
49 DA 17, vol. 2052, no. 67, 80; DA 17, vol. 2132, no. 171; DAiP, IV/2: p. 322; S. M,
≈Sasluπanje jednog hajduËkog harambaπe.« Istoriski zapisi 1 (1953): pp. 256-259.
50 DA 17, vol. 16, no. 1682; DA 17, vol. 2052, no. 18, 93; DA 17, vol. 2053, no. 5; DA 17,
vol. 2125, no. 81, 111, 112, 114, 119, 123, 238.
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Conclusion
The subjects of the Dubrovnik Republic, especially those residing along
its inland, experienced tormenting moments during the wars waged in the
region. Freely and without any restraint, bands of brigands roamed the bor-
derland and the rest of the Republic. The majority of these armed bands at-
tacked Ragusan villages, kidnapped people, and stole everything they could.
Such circumstances led to an irregular food supply and the disturbance of trade
relations with neighboring Herzegovina.
The terror and disorder of the Morean War followed shortly after the ex-
hausting Cretan War (1645-1669) and the great earthquake of 1667. The pov-
erty-stricken borderland of the Dubrovnik Republic also suffered from fam-
ine and plague. Although the Ragusan government masterfully struggled for
the well-being and interests of its state, the absence of organized armed forces
made it absolutely helpless and incapable of protecting its subjects. As a re-
sult, its subjects, particularly the frontiersmen, took part in military opera-
tions. By passing various acts, the authorities tried to keep them from col-
laborating with brigands or the likes. But the neutrality of the Ragusan
state was difficult to attain, both politically and in practice. The population
along the border abode by the mob law of Herzegovina: they polarized into
brigands and their victims. Deep poverty and growing crime outlawed
Ragusans into brigand bands and, together with Herzegovinians, they attacked
their fellow-countrymen. The Ragusan non-brigand population pursued all
brigands—both compatriots and those from across the border—and at the same
time offered shelter to non-brigands in flight from the hinterland and held
their property in safekeeping.
Although Ragusan subjects were constantly victimized by the brigands,
the very fact that some Ragusans were joining these bands served as a per-
fect excuse for Herzegovinian Turks and pandours to plunder the villages of
the Republic. Anarchy and violence from Herzegovina spread throughout the
Ragusan borderland like a disease.
